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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Respondent-Appellee Employers' Reinsurance Func} ("ERF") agrees with the
statement of jurisdiction contained in the brief of Petitioner^-Appellants Larsen Beverage
and/or Globe Indemnity Company (together "Larsen Beverage" or "Appellants"), except
to clarify that the Court's jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Annotated section 78A4-103 (2009), section 78-2a-3 having been recodified,
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether the Utah Labor Commission ("Labor Commission") erred

by affirming Administrative Law Judge La Jeunesse's ("Jucjge La Jeunesse" or "ALJ")
Final Order of Permanent Total Disability ("Order") where JLarsen Beverage had
previously stipulated to the relief granted.
Standard of Review: ERF agrees with the standard of review set forth by
Larsen Beverage.
2.

Issue: Whether the non-inclusion of Larsen Beverage's Pre-Trial

Disclosures in the Record violated Larsen Beverage's due ptocess rights where: (a) the
Pre-Trial Disclosures were on file with the Labor Commission; (b) Larsen Beverage had
presented its position to the Labor Commission; (c) Larsen leverage stipulated to the
relief granted by the Labor Commission; and (d) Larsen Beyerage's Motion to
Supplement Record was granted, fully correcting any claimed error.
Standard of Review: ERF agrees with the standard of review set forth by
Larsen Beverage.
1

Larsen Beverage has also raised a third issue for review in the argument section of
its brief—i.e., the sufficiency of the Order's factual findings and conclusions of law. (Br.
of Appellants at 38.) ERF does not believe this is a separate issue since Larsen Beverage
stipulated to the result obtained, as discussed more folly below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

This case involves the interpretation of a stipulation between the parties regarding
the payment of permanent total disability benefits to an employee injured in an industrial
accident. Applicant Danna Hutchison was employed for Larsen Beverage and injured her
back while performing her duties. The parties entered into a Stipulation and Order of
Tentative Permanent Total Disability ("Stipulated Order") regarding the payment of
benefits to Ms. Hutchison. Such stipulations were commonly made under Utah Code
Annotated section 35-1-67(5), leaving open only the issue of possible rehabilitation. In
this case, there was a clearly stated bargain: Larsen Beverage agreed to pay "all" of Ms.
Hutchison's medical expenses related to the accident while ERF agreed to pay all
permanent total disability benefits, accruing after March 1, 2004. The parties stipulated
that Ms. Hutchison was entitled to a tentative finding of permanent total disability. The
finding of permanent total disability (and ERF's payments based on that finding) was
tentative because the law in effect at the time required that the injured worker be
evaluated by the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation before a final order was entered.

2

Larsen Beverage now seeks to undo the Stipulated Order. It claims that the entire
agreement was tentative, including its unconditional agreement to pay all of Ms.
Hutchison's medical expenses. Larsen Beverage asked the | ALJ and Labor Commission
(and now asks this Court) to order ERF to reimburse it for ]Us. Hutchison's medical
expenses. However, the terms of the Stipulated Order are c^lear and unambiguous; they
do not entitle Larsen Beverage to the relief it seeks. There \s no provision in the
Stipulated Order for a reevaluation of the division of liability between Larsen Beverage
and ERF after the permanent total disability to which Larse^i Beverage had stipulated was
confirmed by the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation. Neither is there any provision in
the Stipulated Order related to reimbursement by ERF of medical expenses. The only
condition in the Stipulated Order was that Ms. Hutchison bd evaluated by the Utah State
Office of Rehabilitation and the effect such evaluation migl^t have on the term of ERF's
future payments. Both the ALJ and Labor Commission properly interpreted the
Stipulated Order and held Larsen Beverage to the deal it made.
II.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Belqw

Ms. Hutchison initiated this action on July 1, 2004, b^ filing an Application for
Hearing with the Labor Commission. (R. at 1.) Ms. Hutchi$on claimed permanent total
compensation for an injury she sustained while working for (Larsen Beverage. (R. at 1.)
Following mediation in March 2005, the parties entered into the Stipulated Order. (R. at
52-56.) Counsel for all parties, including Larsen Beverage, reviewed and signed the

3

Stipulated Order, indicating their agreement. (R. at 55,) The Stipulation was then
approved by Administrative Law Judge Donald L. George on April 29, 2005. (R. at 54.)
In the Stipulated Order, the parties agreed that Ms. Hutchison was "entitled to a
tentative finding of permanent total disability" and that she would be referred to the Utah
State Office of Rehabilitation for vocational rehabilitation training, (R. at 53.) The
Stipulated Order required ERF to pay Ms. Hutchison permanent total disability
compensation commencing March 1, 2004, "and continuing until further order of the
Labor Commission." (R. at 53.) Larsen Beverage unconditionally agreed to pay "all
medical expenses resulting from the industrial accident" suffered by Ms. Hutchison, (R.
at 53.)
Under the statute in effect at the time of Ms. Hutchison's injury, a finding of
permanent total disability was in all cases tentative until the injured employee completed
vocational rehabilitation evaluation by the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation. See Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1993). The only condition in the Stipulated Order concerned Ms.
Hutchison's vocational rehabilitation. (See R. at 54.) The Stipulated Order provides that
Ms. Hutchison would participate in vocational rehabilitation and, depending on the
outcome of her rehabilitation efforts, the entitlement to permanent total disability
compensation could be revisited by the Labor Commission. Larsen Beverage's
agreement to pay Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses was not contingent upon any
subsequent event and, thus, no conditions were recited in the order portion of the
Stipulated Order. (See R. at 53-54.) In particular, the Stipulated Order did not provide
4

for any reimbursement of medical expenses to Larsen Beverage nor did it provide for an
apportionment of future medical expenses incurred by Ms. Hutchison as a result of the
industrial accident.
In March 2006, Judge George retired and Administrative Law Judge Richard M.
La Jeunesse was assigned to the case. On March 15, 2006, Judge La Jeunesse entered an
order terminating payment of permanent total disability benefits to Ms. Hutchison
because she failed to cooperate with the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation. (R. at 6465.) After later participating in the vocational rehabilitation process, Ms. Hutchison
moved for reinstatement of her permanent total disability benefits. (R. at 69.) Judge La
Jeunesse granted the motion and payment of benefits to Ms. Hutchison was "reinstated
pursuant to the April 2005 Stipulation and Order approved tfy Judge Donald L. George."
(R. at 72.)
A hearing was held on January 29, 2007, to consider |Ms. Hutchison's vocational
rehabilitation. (See R. at 102, 105. See also R. vol. 5 (hearing transcript).)1 Prior to the

1

Larsen Beverage claims that Judge George, not Judge La Jeunesse, presided at the
January 2007 hearing. (Br. of Appellants at 15-16.) Nothing in the Record supports this
contention. The notices of the hearing indicate that it was to be held before Judge La
Jeunesse. (R. at 102, 105.) Larsen Beverage sent a letter to Judge La Jeunesse requesting
that the original hearing date be rescheduled due to a scheduling conflict. (R. at 103.)
Two weeks before the hearing, Larsen Beverage forwarded a copy of the supplemental
medical exhibit to Judge la Jeunesse. (R. at 106.) Judge La Jeunesse is identified as the
judge on the hearing transcript, (R. vol. 5), and he issued the Order following the hearing,
(R. at 107-10). In his written opinions, Judge La Jeunesse was careful to distinguish
between those portions of the case over which he and Judge George respectively
presided. (Seef e.g., R. at 108.) The Record indicates that Ji^dge La Jeunesse was the
5

hearing, Larsen Beverage submitted its Pre-Trial Disclosure Form, asking for
reimbursement from ERF of haif of all medical expenses in excess of $20,000, contrary
to the prior agreement of the parties as set forth in the Stipulated Order. (R. at 105(b).)
At the hearing, Larsen Beverage apparently requested reimbursement of medical
expenses, contrary to the terms of the Stipulated Order. (R. vol. 5 at 4.) Notably, Larsen
Beverage did not contest the permanent total disability status of Ms. Hutchison, the only
issue left open by the Stipulated Order, and agreed that benefits to her "should be
continued as they have been to-date." (R. vol. 5 at 4:18-21.) Judge La Jeunesse indicated
that he would issue an order of ongoing permanent total disability and appropriate
reimbursement. (R. vol. 5 at 5.)
The order requested by Larsen Beverage was not issued. Instead, apparently
having an opportunity to fully review the file, including the Stipulated Order, Judge La
Jeunesse issued the Order, confirming and integrating the parties' Stipulated Order. (R.
at 107-10.) Judge La Jeunesse adopted the facts to which the parties stipulated in the
Stipulated Order and determined that Ms. Hutchison could not be vocationally
rehabilitated. (R. at 109.) Judge La Jeunesse also noted Larsen Beverage's stipulation at
the January 2007 hearing "that Ms. Hutchison's permanent total disability compensation
benefits should continue pursuant to the 2005 Order." (R. at 109.) Based on those

only administrative law judge involved in the case after march 2006 (including at the
January 2007 hearing). (See R. at 62-131.) It is unlikely that Judge George participated
in the hearing over a year after his retirement.
6

findings, Judge La Jeunesse resolved the only tentative aspect of the Stipulated Order
(i.e., Ms. Hutchison's vocational rehabilitation and its effeqt on ERPs payment of
benefits), and ordered ERF to pay permanent total compensation to Ms. Hutchison. (R. at
109.) Judge La Jeunesse also ordered Larsen Beverage to pay Ms. Hutchison "all"
medical expenses related to her industrial accident, as previously agreed in the Stipulated
Order. (R. at 109.)
On May 9, 2007, Larsen Beverage moved for relief from the Order or,
alternatively, to alter or amend the Order under Rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. (R. at 112-15.) Larsen Beverage argued that Order contained legal
errors. Specifically, it argued that the Stipulated Order wasfctentative agreement and
could not form the basis for the final determination of benefits to be paid to Ms.
Hutchison. (R. at 115.) Larsen Beverage also argued that ElRF should be ordered to
reimburse Larsen Beverage for Ms. Hutchison's past medic4l expenses and for allocation
of future medical expenses. (R. at 112.)
Before Judge La Jeunesse had a chance to rule on its ^notion, Larsen Beverage
filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission, advancing the same arguments.
(R. at 118-20.) ERF filed a Memorandum in Opposition to potion for Review, arguing
that Larsen Beverage stipulated to the division of liability adapted by Judge La Jeunesse.
(R. at 125.) ERF also argued that the only condition in the Stipulated Order was the
requirement that Ms. Hutchinson be evaluated by the Utah S^ate Office of Rehabilitation

7

and that there was no provision for revisiting the allocation of responsibility as between
ERF and Larsen Beverage. (R. at 126.)
On review, the Labor Commission held that the Stipulated was an enforceable
agreement between the parties and that Larsen Beverage had agreed to pay all of Ms.
Hutchison's medical expenses. (R. at 130-31.) The Labor Commission rejected Larsen
Beverage's argument that it was entitled to reimbursement and allocation of medical
expenses simply because the Stipulated Order left open the issue of vocational
rehabilitation. (R. at 131.) Rather, the Stipulated Order "clearly shows that Larsen
[Beverage] intended to be responsible for all medical expenses resulting from the
accident." (R. at 131.) The Labor Commission further noted that "the only condition
within the agreement based Ms. Hutchison's permanent total disability compensation on
presenting herself for evaluation with the State Office of Rehabilitation . . . . The
evidence does not support Larsen[ Beverage's] position that it agreed to be bound based
on tentative conditions . . . . " (R. at 131.) The Labor Commission therefore affirmed the
Order requiring "Larsen [Beverage] to pay all of Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses
reasonably related to the accident." (R. at 131.) This appeal followed.
III.

Statement of Facts

L

Ms. Hutchison injured her lower back in an industrial accident on August

23, 1993, while working for Larsen Beverage. (R. at 1.)

8

2.

Ms. Hutchison previously suffered a back injury in 1984 that resulted in a

10% whole person impairment "based on the Labor Commission Impairment Guides."
(R. at 52.)
3.

As a result of these injuries and several resulting surgeries, Ms. Hutchison

was awarded a 20% whole person impairment on December 9, 1999. (R. at 23.)
4.

Ms. Hutchison was again evaluated on March 4, 2004, and she was deemed

"totally disabled;' (R. vol. 2 at 107.)
5-

On July 1, 2004, Ms. Hutchison filed an Application for Hearing with the

Labor Commission. (R. at 1.)
6.

Following mediation, ERF and Larsen Beverage resolved the issues of

responsibility for payment of medical expenses and ongoing permanent total disability
benefits. Their agreement was set forth in the Stipulated Order which was approved by
counsel for all parties. (R. at 52-55.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I.

The Labor Commission Properly Affirmed the Order Because Larsen
Beverage Agreed to the Relief Granted,
Larsen Beverage first claims that the ALJ and Labor (Commission erred by

rejecting Larsen Beverage's claim for reimbursement of me4ical expenses from ERF.
(Br. of Appellants at 23.) Larsen Beverage argues that reimbursement was required
9

because its agreement in the Stipulated Order to pay Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses
was tentative. Larsen Beverage argues, in essence, that the Stipulated Order is
ambiguous. (Br. of Appellants at 30.) It is not. Essentially, Larsen Beverage's claim is
that because the Stipulated Order contains the word "tentative," referring to Ms.
Hutchison's disability status, all other provisions of the agreement are also tentative.
This argument should be rejected because it contravenes the plain terms of the Stipulated
Order.
Courts are ordinarily bound by stipulations between the parties. Yeargin, Inc. v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm % 2001 UT 11, % 19, 20 P.3d 287. See also
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979) (noting
that "[settlements are favored, and should be encouraged," and that "[i]t is quite well
established" courts have authority to enforce settlement agreements). Similarly binding
are stipulations entered into in administrative proceedings. Year gin, Inc. v. Auditing Div.
of the Utah State Tax Comm n, 2001 UT 11, ] 19, 20 P.3d 287.2

The Yeargin court also noted that courts are hesitant "to relieve a party from a
stipulation negotiated and entered into with the advice of counsel" and that a stipulation
should only be set aside under certain conditions, including a showing "that the
stipulation was entered into inadvertently." Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah
State Tax Comm % 2001 UT 11, % 21, 20 P.3d 287 (quotation marks omitted).
Inadvertence, however, "cannot be the basis for repudiation when the mistake was due to
failure to exercise due diligence, [or if it could] have been avoided by the exercise of
ordinary care." Id., 20 P.3d 287 (alteration in original and quotation marks omitted). The
court stated that "it is unlikely that a stipulation signed by counsel and filed with the court
was entered into inadvertently." Id, 20 P.3d 287 (quotation marks omitted).
10

As Larsen Beverage correctly points out, the general rules of contract
interpretation guide a court's analysis of a stipulation or settlement agreement. A court's
purpose in construing a contract is to ascertain the parties' intentions, which are
controlling, and courts look to the writing itself to ascertainl those intentions. WebBank v.
Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,ffi[17-18, 54 P^d 1139. Where the language
used in the contract is unambiguous, "the parties' intentions are determined from the
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a
matter of law." Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 2006 UT 20, f|21, 133 P.3d 428 (quotation
marks omitted). A contractual term or provision is ambiguous "if it is capable of more
than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing
terms, or other facial deficiencies." Daines v. Vincent, 200$ UT 51, \ 25, 190 P.3d 1269
(quotation marks omitted).
The terms of the Stipulated Order are plain and unambiguous; they clearly set
forth the parties' intentions. After setting forth the underlying facts, the Stipulated Order
provides that "based on her impairment from the accident off August 23, 1993, the parties
conclude [Ms. Hutchison] is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent total disability."
(R. at 53.) The parties acknowledged that Ms. Hutchison wcHild "be referred to the Utah
State Office of Rehabilitation Services for rehabilitation trailing as provided by Section
35-1-67." (R. at 53.) ERF agreed to place Ms. Hutchison on its payroll and pay her
"permanent total disability benefits at the rate of $227 per week commencing March 1,
2004 and continuing until further order of the Labor Commission." (R. at 53.) Larsen
11

Beverage agreed to "be responsible for all medical expenses resulting from the industrial
accident of August 23, 1993." (R. at 53.) In the order portion of the Stipulated Order,
Judge George ordered ERF to pay Ms. Hutchison permanent total disability benefits with
"[s]aid benefits to continue until further order of the Labor Commission." (R. at 54.) He
also ordered Ms. Hutchison to attend rehabilitation training. (R. at 54.) Significantly,
counsel for all parties signed the Stipulated Order confirming their "APPROVAL OF
STIPULATION AND ORDER." (R. at 55 (emphasis added).)
There is no ambiguity with respect to Larsen Beverage's obligation. It agreed to
pay all of Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses. This obligation was not conditional and
"air' is not an ambiguous term, see Novell, Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App
162, ^f 28, 92 P.3d 768. Larsen Beverage points to the word"tentative" and the term
"until further order of the Labor Commission" to argue that its duty was conditional.
(E.g., Br. of Appellants at 30, 33-34.) Each instance cited by Larsen Beverage, however,
relates to an obligation of Ms. Hutchison or ERF regarding rehabilitation and permanent
total disability benefits. The Stipulated Order does not provide Larsen Beverage's
obligation will continue until further order of the Labor Commission nor does it condition
the obligation to pay medical benefits upon some future event. The Stipulated Order
contains no provision allowing the parties to revisit their division of responsibility. The
sole contingency was Ms. Hutchison's obligation to attend vocational rehabilitation and
the effect that might have on payments by ERF. Larsen Beverage has not advanced a
contrary interpretation of the Stipulated Order that is reasonably supported by its terms.
12

See Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 5\,% 26, 190 P3d 1269. It unambiguously agreed to pay
all of Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses. As the Labor Commission held, "[t]he
evidence does not support Larsenf Beverage]'s position that it agreed to be bound based
on tentative conditions. (R. at 131.)
Larsen Beverage also argues that because the order portion of the Stipulated Order
does not mention the obligation to pay medical benefits, su^h an obligation must not
exist. (Br. of Appellants at 34.) This argument, however, proves too much. Under the
law in effect in 1993, a finding of permanent total disability was in all cases tentative
until the injured worker underwent an evaluation by the Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(5) (1993). Thus^ the finding of Ms.
Hutchison's permanent total disability was tentative until sh£ could undergo the
evaluation. Judge George ordered her to do so. Because th0 finding of permanent total
disability was tentative, the duration of ERF's promise to pajy permanent total disability
was left open, conditioned on the results of Ms. Hutchison's rehabilitation. Those were
the only two provisions which were conditional and the onlyi two that needed to be
recited in the order portion of the Stipulated Order. The remaining terms of the parties'
bargain, including Larsen Beverage's promise to pay all medical expenses, were already
finalized and no further order was necessary.
Larsen Beverage's reliance on Empey v. Industrial Commission, 63 P.2d 630
(Utah 1937), and Continental Casualty Co, v. Industrial Commission, 210 P. 127 (Utah
1922), is misplaced. (See Br. of Appellants at 35 & nn.6-7.) While those decisions
13

provide that the Labor Commission does not have jurisdiction to reform an agreement
they did not hold that "the Commission does not even have the jurisdictional ability to
enforce or interpret contractual provisions" as claimed by Larsen Beverage. (See Br. of
Appellants at 35.) In fact, the Continental Casualty court expressly held that the Labor
Commission has the authority to enforce a contract.3 The court there held that with
respect to an insurance contract, "[t]he commission had no power to do otherwise than to
enforce and apply its terms." Cont'l Cas. Co, v. Indus. Comm'n, 210 P. 127, 129 (Utah
1922) (emphasis added). The court further stated that it is "the duty of the commission to
enforce the letter of the contract." Cont'l Cas, Co, v. Indus. Comm'n, 210 P. 127, 129
(Utah 1922) (emphasis added).
Larsen Beverage's argument is further inapposite because it is based on the
incorrect assumption that the ALJ and Labor Commission rewrote the Stipulated Order.
They did not. They simply enforced the agreement as written, as they are empowered
and, indeed, required, to do. Enforcement of the Stipulated Order will not discourage the
provision of temporary benefits to injured workers as Larsen Beverage predicts. It may,
however, encourage parties to be careful when entering into contracts.
Larsen Beverage also claims that the "confusion" regarding the interpretation of
the Stipulated Order may have resulted from the transfer of the case from Judge George

3

The language quoted by Larsen Beverage in footnote 6 of its brief is itself a quotation
by the Empey court of the holding in Continental Casualty, See Empey v. Indus,
Comm'n, 63 P.2d 630, 635 (Utah 1937).
14

to Judge La Jeunesse. (Br. of Appellants at 29.) Larsen Beverage seems to argue that
this transfer occurred after the January 2007 hearing. Nothing in the Record, however,
supports the argument that Judge George presided at the Jaiiuary 2007 hearing. The
Record suggests just the opposite—i.e., that it was Judge La Jeunesse who presided at the
hearing. The transfer of the case to Judge La Jeunesse followed Judge George's
retirement which occurred more than a year before the hearing. (See supra note 1.)
Even if Judge George did preside at the hearing, thatl fact provides no relief to
Larsen Beverage. While the ALJ may have indicated at the] hearing he would consider
issuing an order of reimbursement, no order of reimbursem0nt ever issued. Rather, after
having a chance to carefully review the file, including the Stipulated Order, Judge La
Jeunesse determined that Larsen Beverage already stipulate^ to payments that made
reimbursement unnecessary and held Larsen Beverage to itsl agreement. Courts are free
to reconsider or change their prior rulings at any time before final resolution of the case.
See, e.g., U.R.C.P. 54(b); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 8^4 P.2d 1306, 1310-11 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994). Larsen Beverage's claim that the ALJ overlooked or was unaware of its
claim for reimbursement is speculative at best. Larsen Beverage's stipulation made it
unnecessary to make findings under the allocation statute—Ijarsen Beverage agreed "be
responsible for all medical expenses resulting from the industrial accident." (R. at 53.)

4

Neither is their Record support for the claim that the Labor Commission overlooked
Larsen Beverage's request for reimbursement. (See Br. of AJppellants at 30.) The Labor
Commission specifically addressed Larsen Beverage's arguihent "that it is entitled to
reimbursement and allocation for medical expenses." (R. at 131.)
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The Order was plainly not the effect of any confusion following the transfer of the case to
Judge La Jeunesse.
The ALJ and Labor Commission had no obligation to order reimbursement of
medical expenses under the statute because Larsen Beverage agreed to pay "all" of them.
See Pacheco v. Indus. Comm % 668 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah 1983) (affirming Labor
Commission's enforcement of settlement agreement and decision not to award statutory
interest available to claimants under the Workers' Compensation Act where parties did
not include a provision for interest in their agreement). Larsen Beverage has failed to
identify any authority requiring reimbursement or application of section 35-1-67(5)
(1993) in all cases.
In essence, Larsen Beverage waived its claim for reimbursement. Waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Red Cliffs Corner, LLC v. J.J. Hunan, Inc.,
2009 UT App 240, ^ 33, 219 P.3d 619. Larsen Beverage knew of the potential
reimbursement for medical expenses prior to entering into the Stipulated Order-it had
asserted such a claim in its Answer. (R. at 40.) Even so, Larsen Beverage expressly
approved the Stipulated Order, demonstrating its intent to relinquish that right by
agreeing unconditionally to pay "all" medical expenses.

16

II.

The Court May Similarly Reject Larsen Beverage's Arguments Regarding
the Adequacy of the Order and Due Process Violation,
A.

The Court need not consider the remaining issues presented by Larsen
Beverage because they are raised for thefiirsttime on appeal and
inadequately briefed.

The Court need not consider the two remaining issues raised by Larsen Beverage.
The first is the alleged violation of Larsen Beverage's due process rights. (Br. of
Appellants at 2, 39-40.) The other, although not identified ^s an issue presented for
review, (see Br. of Appellants at 1-2), is Larsen Beverage's claim that Order's factual
findings and conclusions of law are inadequate, (Br. of Appellants at 38). The Court may
disregard these issues for a number of reasons.
First, Larsen Beverage raises both the adequacy of thb Order and due process
issues for the first time on appeal. It does not appear from the Record that these issues
were argued before either the ALJ or Labor Commission. T^ie Court need not consider
an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Ortiz v. Indus, Cpmm 'n of Utah, 766 P.2d
1092, 1094 (Utah Ct App. 1989). See also State v. Dudley, \U1 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) ("[T]he proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis
of state constitutional interpretation is before the trial court, p o t . . . for the first time on
appeal." (quotation marks omitted)). And Larsen Beverage lias not argued that the
exceptions to this rule (i.e., plain error or exceptional circumstances) are applicable in
this case. See State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, f 5, 63 P.3d 6^.
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In addition, Larsen Beverage has failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Larsen Beverage did not identify the standard of review
for its third issue (adequacy of the Order) as required by Rule 24(a)(5). Additionally,
Larsen Beverage failed to comply with subsection (A) of Rule 24(a)(5) which requires a
"citation to the record showing that the issue [presented for review] was preserved"
below. None of the three issues identified by Larsen Beverage includes the required
citation. (See Br. of Appellants at 1-2, 38.). Courts need not address the merits of a
party's argument if the party's brief fails to comply with Rule 24. See, e.g., Utah R. App.
P. 24(k); Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 198-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Beyond the deficiencies described above, Larsen Beverage provides no citation to
any authority for either of the two remaining issues, rendering the arguments inadequate.
See State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 22, 128 P.3d 1179 ("An adequate brief is one that fully
identifies and analyzes the issues with citation to relevant legal authority."); Burns v.
Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199-200 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("In this case, in which the
appellant has failed to provide adequate legal analysis and legal authority in support of
his claims, appellant's assertions do not permit appellate review."). For example, Larsen
Beverage does not specify whether its due process claim is made under the federal or
state constitution. "For the court to consider a . . . constitutional claim, a litigant must at
least define the nature of that protection and provide some argument as to how legal
precedent supports its position." Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, % 74, 73
P.3d 334. "Mere allusion to . . . constitutional claims, unsupported by meaningful
18

analysis, does not permit appellate review." State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993). Larsen Beverage's conclusory arguments do pot permit appropriate review
and the Court therefore need not consider them. Nevertheless, ERF addresses these
issues below.
B.

The Order contains adequate findings of f^ct and conciusions of law.

Larsen Beverage's second point is that the Order do^s not contain adequate factual
findings. (Br. of Appellants at 38.) Larsen Beverage also states that the Order is contrary
to the evidence. (Br. of Appellants at 23.) But its argument is unavailing. "[Findings of
fact 'must show that the court's judgment or decree follows! logically from, and is
supported by, the evidence.'" Strate v. Labor Comm % 20016 UT App 179,ffl[16, 21, 136
P.3d 1273. The Order follows logically from the evidence Here, specifically the
unambiguous terms of the parties' written agreement. Further, if a litigant does not
directly challenge any of the factual findings, appellate courts "will assume that they are
supported by the record and [will] not disturb them." Amerlfemps, Inc. v. Labor
Comm % 2005 UT App 491, \ 27, 128 P.3d 31. 5
Judge La Jeunesse adopted in his Order the facts set ffarth in the Stipulated Order.
The Stipulated Order clearly sets forth the underlying facts that resulted in a finding of
permanent total disability and an award of benefits. (R. at 5 £-53.) The Stipulated Order

5

As the Court also noted in Ameritemps, even if Larsen Beverage had directly challenged
the factual findings, it failed to satisfy its duty to marshal the evidence, risking the
Court's refusal to consider the argument. See Ameritemps, Ike. v. Labor Common, 2005
UT App 491, f 27 n.5, 128 P.3d 31.
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describes Ms. Hutchison's industrial injury, prior injury, and attempts to treat them. (R.
at 52.) The Stipulated Order also describes Ms. Hutchison's salary and the status of me
parties to this case. (R. at 53.) Simply because the Stipulated Order does not contain a
separate section titled "Findings of Fact," does not render the stipulated facts inadequate,
as Larsen Beverage seems to argue. (See Br. of Appellants at 38.)
Moreover, there was no dispute as to the underlying facts—Larsen Beverage
stipulated to them all. Larsen Beverage also stipulated that il would pay "all" of Ms.
Hutchison's medical expenses. Larsen Beverage's complaint does not seem to be with
the facts underlying the Order, but with the agreement it made by entering into the
Stipulated Order. Its regret, however, provides no basis on which to claim that the factual
findings in the Order are inadequate or to unwind the Stipulated Order. The facts set
forth in the Stipulated Order and incorporated into the Order are "sufficiently detailed"
and support the ultimate conclusion reached by Judge La Jeunesse. See Strate v. Labor
Comm , n,2006UTApp 179,121, 136P.3d 1273.
The Order similarly sets forth adequate conclusions of law. After the parties
entered into the Stipulated Order, the issue remaining for decision was the tentative
finding of Ms. Hutchison's permanent total disability, which was conditioned on her
vocational rehabilitation. The January 2007 hearing was held to address that issue. (See
R. at 105 (providing notice of hearing to "Consider the Opinion of the Utah State Office
of Rehabilitation").) Again, Larsen Beverage stipulated to the conclusions adopted in the
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Order. Judge La Jeunesse then resolved the remaining issiie concerning Ms. Hutchison's
rehabilitation. (R. at 109.)
Judge La Jeunesse was aware of Larsen Beverage's Argument regarding
reimbursement, both from its Pre-Trial Disclosures and discussion at the January 2007
hearing. But he, and later the Labor Commission, determined that the Stipulated Order
was controlling. They considered, and rejected, Larsen Beverage's claim for
reimbursement. This is illustrated by the fact that Judge La Jeunesse indicated he would
consider ordering but later determined to hold Larsen Beverage to the terms of its
agreement. The Order even quotes paragraph 8 of the Stipulated Order, setting forth
Larsen Beverage's agreement to pay "all" of Ms. Hutchison's medical expenses related to
the industrial accident. The Order contains adequate conclusions of law and Larsen
Beverage's renewed attempt here to undo the deal it bargained for must be rejected.
C,

The due process claim is without merit

Larsen Beverage's final argument is that the Labor Commission erred by omitting
Larsen Beverage's Pre-Trial Disclosures from the Record. (|Br. of Appellants at 39.) But
Larsen Beverage has provided no authority suggesting that the exclusion of material from
the Record constitutes a violation of due process rights. It seems instead that the issue is
not whether Larsen Beverage was afforded due process, but whether Judge La Jeunesse
and the Labor Commission were aware of Larsen Beverage'$ claim for reimbursement.
(See R. at 40 ("[I]t would appear that ALJ LaJeunesse [sic] cjid not have all the necessary
information to review the justiciable matters for review . . . .'f).) Stated another way,
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because the Pre-Trial Disclosures were not included in the Record prepared for this
appeal, Judge La Jeunesse must not have been aware of them when he issued the Order.
This claim is baseless.
Judge La Jeunesse was well-aware of Larsen Beverage's argument regarding
reimbursement. According to Larsen Beverage, the claim was presented in writing in
both its Answer and Pre-Trial Disclosures. (Br. of Appellants at 10, 39.) Although the
Pre-Trial Disclosures may have been omitted from the appellate Record, Larsen Beverage
acknowledges that they were entered into the Labor Commission's system and therefore
were part of the Labor Commission File. (R. at 40.)
The reimbursement argument was again presented to the Labor Commission as it
reviewed Judge La Jeunesse's Order. (R. at 118-20.) The Labor Commission reviewed
and specifically addressed Larsen Beverage's claim. (R. at 131.) The omission of the
Pre-Trial Disclosures from the Record on appeal in no way indicates that Judge La
Jeunesse or the Labor Commission failed to consider Larsen Beverage's claim for
reimbursement; Larsen Beverage's claims to the contrary are speculative. Larsen
Beverage fails to show how the decisions of Judge La Jeunesse or the Labor Commission
would have been different had the Pre-Trial Disclosures been included in the Record on
appeal, particularly where those decisions all preceded the compilation of the Record.
Further, and importantly, ERF agreed to the result sought by Larsen Beverage's motion
to supplement the record. The motion was granted, thus correcting any purported error
on appeal. Larsen Beverage's due process claim is therefore meritless.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ERF requests that the decision of the Utah Labor
Commission be affirmed.
Dated this ^ 5 til day of August 2010.
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